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This study focuses on the correlation between secured debt and managerial risk-taking 
incentive. A few findings need to be emphasized. First is the positive relation between 
secured debt and managerial risk-taking incentive (LNVEGA). This relation is 
confirmed by several robustness tests. This relation indicates that secured debt ratio is 
affected by executive compensation and increases in managerial risk-taking incentive.  
Second, I posit that this positive relation can be explained in two possible ways. “Free 
cash flow hypothesis” gives the reason that firms with high risk-taking incentives 
would like to use more secured debt to generate extra cash to finance risky projects. 
On the other hand, “Cost contracting hypothesis” implies that the positive relation is 
driven by the fact that shareholders try to raise secured debt ratio to compensate 
creditors due to the increasing managerial risk-taking incentives. These two 
hypotheses have different predictions for the wealth effect of secured debt ratio 
change. That is how I distinguish them to find out what drives the positive relation 
between secured debt ratio and managerial risk-taking incentive. 
Overall, this research extends literature in several ways, including executive 
equity-based compensation, determinants of secured debt issuance and agency cost of 
debt. Among them, the key finding of this study lies in the role of secured debt in 
mitigating the agency cost between shareholders and creditors arising from 
managerial risk-taking incentive.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations 
The use of equity-based executive compensation, such as stock and option, has widely 
increased over the past few decades (Murphy, 1999). The effects of managerial 
compensation incentives on financing and investment policies have been evaluated in 
two different aspects. One is the managerial option portfolio sensitivity to stock price, 
which aligns the interest of risk-averse and undiversified manager with the interests of 
shareholders. This is considered as managerial risk-decreasing incentive. The other is 
managerial option portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility, which encourages 
managers to take riskier investment and financing policies (Core & Guay, 2002). It is 
viewed as managerial risk-taking incentive. There is a growing body of literature 
focusing on how managerial compensation incentives could affect corporate policies, 
such as corporate capital structure, debt maturity, and corporate liquidity policy 
(Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 2010). To my knowledge, 
very few studies have examined how managerial risk-taking incentive affects secured 
debt.  
The significance of secured debt lies in the fairly large amount of secured debt, which 
takes a big proportion of firms’ total liabilities. Berger & Udell (1990) and Harhoff & 
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Korting (1998) found that nearly 70% of commercial and industrial loans are secured 
in the US and UK. In addition, the World Bank Investment Climate Survey
1
 indicates 
that real estate represents 50% of collateral for firms in 58 emerging countries, which 
suggests real estate is considered as one of the most important forms of collateral. All 
these studies point out the importance of secured debt.  
When looking through the literature, I found that secured debt as part of corporate 
debt policy could be affected by managerial risk-taking incentive. Moreover, theories 
have different predictions towards the correlation between secured debt and 
managerial risk-taking incentive. 
Jensen & Mecking (1976) have found that equity-based compensation, especially 
stock options, could motivate managers to adopt risky corporate policies. Coles et al. 
(2006) argue that managerial risk-taking incentive arising from equity compensation 
provides a CEO with an incentive to invest in riskier assets and obtain more 
aggressive debt policies with more flexibility and higher cost. Therefore, managerial 
risk-taking incentive would be inversely related to secured debt ratio (the portion of 
secured debt in total liabilities).  
On the other hand, the literature also suggests a positive relation between managerial 
risk-taking incentive and secured debt ratio. First, Berkovitch & Kim (1990) 
                                                 
1 See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/ics/jsp/index.jsp for further details.  
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documents that debt with pledged assets could induce overinvestment problems due to 
the lower cost of secured debt. Firms with managerial risk-taking incentives could use 
more secured debt to generate extra cash flow for risky projects. Thus, shareholders 
benefit from the risky investment with lower cost of debt, and firms with high 
managerial option portfolio sensitivities to stock return volatilities would prefer to use 
more secured debt.  
Second, Brockman et al. (2010) and Billett et al. (2010) argue that firms with higher 
managerial risk-taking incentives are more likely to engage in asset substitution 
problem and exacerbate the interest conflicts between shareholders and creditors. The 
rationale is that managers with risk-taking incentives may jeopardize creditors’ 
benefits by substituting less risky assets for risky ones. Creditors will require 
protection and cost of debt will increase. As a result, firms with managerial 
risk-taking incentives probably have to compensate creditors through certain 
corporate policies, such as shorter debt maturity. As suggested by Barclay & Smith 
(1995) asset substitution problem could be alleviated by raising the amount of secured 
debt in the total liabilities. Thus, higher secured debt ratio could be an alternative 
other than more short-term debt for firms with managerial risk-taking incentives to 
reduce shareholder-creditor agency conflict, which means a positive relation between 
risk-taking incentive and secured debt ratio.  
Taken together, these different theoretical predictions and perspectives on how 
managerial risk-taking incentive affects secured debt ratio suggest that secured debt 
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can be an interesting and valuable topic on how managerial incentives influence 
shareholders, creditors and their relations. In this thesis, I examine how managerial 
risk-taking incentive affects secured debt and try to find out the reason behind the 
effect of managerial risk-taking on secured debt.  
Although to examine the impact of managerial risk-taking incentive on secured debt 
could yield intriguing results, very few studies focus on this topic. The first reason, 
from my point of view, is the recent advanced methodology in evaluating managerial 
risk incentives through equity compensation. Core & Guay (2002) argue that a better 
approach to evaluate managerial risk incentives is to examine how the value of 
managerial option holdings will increase or decrease due to 1% change in stock price 
and stock return volatility. This approach provides a brand new angle to estimate 
managerial equity compensation, rather than the number of options, or the granted 
value of options. This approach has been widely used since 2002 (See Coles et al., 
2006; Shaw, 2007; Low, 2009; Brockman et al., 2010; Liu et al.2010, among others.). 
Secondly, the usage of secured debt and its function in capital structure are still a 
growing and less developed research area in literature. Smith (1985) documents the 
usage of secured debt could assist firms in achieving the optimal capital structure. 
Ambrose et al. (2010) examine market reaction to the issue of secured debt in REIT 
industry. However, very few studies link managerial risk incentive with secured debt.  
In addition, availability of collaterals limits the usage of secured debt. Most of the 
studies regarding corporate policies or managerial risk incentive consider all the 
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industries in their empirical designs, whereas most of the industries do not possess 
large amount of assets that could be used as collaterals, which restricts their ability to 
issue secured debt, or to consider secured debt as agency-cost reducing approach. 
Thus, I use REIT sample to test the impact of managerial risk-taking on secured debt.  
REIT industry could provide a better test bed to examine the impact of managerial 
risk-taking on secured debt partly because REITs possess quite a few properties as 
their assets which are easy to collateralize, so REITs may have more flexibility on 
secured debt usage and their debt security policies could play a better role in revealing 
managerial incentives and controlling agency problem. On the other hand, REIT 
industry with its special structure and tax-exempt status has been used to test various 
capital structure theories. To examine the usage of secured debt in REITs, as a 
different perspective to look into capital structure, may provide new insight to capital 
structure literature. In addition, REIT managerial risk-taking incentive seems higher 
than those of other sectors when REIT managerial risk-taking incentive computed 
through equity compensation is compared with those of other industrial firms 
documented in Coles et al. (2006), Brockman et al.(2010), Chava & Purnanandam 
(2010), and others. This feature migh make REITs as an interesting sample to examine 
the relation betwwen managerial risk-taking incentive and secured debt.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Given all these motivations, this research is designed to address the following 
research questions: 
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1. What is the impact of managerial risk-taking incentive on secured debt in 
REIT industry? 
2. If managerial risk-taking incentive does influence secured debt, what are the 
possible reasons and explanations for the relation between managerial 
risk-taking incentive and secured debt utilization?  
1.3 Objectives  
In comparison with prevailing research with respect to managerial risk incentive and 
secured debt, this work will examine the impact of managerial risk-taking incentive 
on secured debt ratio, particularly in REIT industry.  
First, it examines how the compensation risk-taking incentive affects the reliance of 
firms on secured debt in the specific REITs market. 
Second, it explores the dominant explanation for this significant relation between 
secured debt ratio and managerial risk-taking incentive by examining the possible 
relationship between REITs excess return and secured debt ratio change associated 
with managerial risk-taking incentive. 
1.4 Significance  
To my knowledge, very few studies have examined the influence of CEO risk-taking 
incentive on secured debt ratio. There are a large number of studies looking into 
managerial incentives and corporate financial policies, such as capital structure, debt 
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maturity, etc (Coles et al.2006; Brockman et al.2010). However, secured debt has not 
been taken into consideration. Also, when these studies link the managerial incentives 
with corporate policies, they mainly concern agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders, whereas they overlook agency cost between shareholders and creditors.  
This is one of the first attempts to detect the effects of CEO risk-taking incentive on 
corporate debt security decision in REITs. REIT industry is constructed as a 
regulatory industry. However, agency problems in REIT industry is still severe and 
likely to be missed. Recently a few studies have looked into REITs corporate 
governance such as board structure and institutional holding (Ghosh et al. 2010; Feng 
et al.2010), and compensation structure (Pennathur et al. 2005). All of these studies 
focus on how to align managerial incentives with shareholders’ interests and how 
managerial incentive would affect firm value. However, interest conflict between 
shareholders and creditors due to managerial risk-taking incentive has not been 
carefully considered.  
This study makes a few contributions to the existing literature. First, the main finding 
of this work is that secured debt could alleviate asset substitution problem between 
shareholders and creditors arising from managerial risk-taking incentive. This finding 
provides empirical support for two theories. On the one hand, it supports Jensen & 
Meckling’s (1976) argument that managerial incentive through equity-based 
compensation could exacerbate the interest conflicts between shareholders and 
creditors. On the other hand, Barclay & Smith (1995) assert that debt maturity and 
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secured debt could mitigate asset substitution problem between shareholders and 
creditors. Related work by Brockman et al. (2010) find that debt maturity could 
attenuate agency cost associated with asset substitution for high CEO risk-taking 
preference. My finding exhibits the evidence that secured debt could also resolve the 
interest conflicts between shareholders and creditors arising from managerial 
risk-taking incentives.  
The empirical findings also add to the literature on corporate secured debt. Leeth & 
Scott (1989) and Barclay & Smith (1995) find that secured debt is affected by firm 
characteristics such as firm size, debt maturity, growth opportunity. Ooi (2001) 
provides evidence that managerial ownership would affect secured debt usage. This 
work extends the literature by pointing out that CEO compensation incentive is an 
additional determinant of corporate secured debt utilization. 
Further, this study expands the understanding of managerial risk-taking incentive on 
corporate capital structure. Novaes & Zingales (1995) indicate that entrenched 
managers would have different optimal leverage choices compared with shareholders. 
Cohen et al. (2000) and Coles et al. (2006) document firms with higher risk-taking 
incentives implement high leverages. Brockman et al. (2010) suggest risk-taking 
incentives would reduce debt maturity. Hart & Moore (1993) argue that self-interested 
managers would prefer lower amount of senior (secured) debt that will limit their 
ability to raise new funds. The study exhibits new evidence that managerial 
risk-taking incentive would increase secured debt ratio.  
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The work also sheds light on creditors’ evaluation of the impact of managerial 
risk-taking incentive on secured debt. As suggested by Brockman et al. (2010) and 
Brillet et al. (2010), creditors will fully consider the risk-shifting and asset 
substitution problems arising from managerial incentive, rationally evaluate them, and 
request compensation because of them.  
In term of methodology, this study examines wealth effect of secured debt ratio 
change to find out how agency cost changes along with CEO risk-taking incentive. I 
follow the approach used by Faulkender & Wang (2006) and Lin et al. (2010), to 
compute excess return as dependent variable, and interaction between secured debt 
ratio change and CEO risk-taking incentive as independent variable. One significant 
feature of this study is to construct the unique REITs benchmark portfolio in order to 
compute the excess return when previous studies use the existing databases.  
1.5 Organization  
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. 
Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to motivations, research questions, 
objectives, significance and organization of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of related studied and develops the hypotheses 
based on the review.  
Chapter 3 illustrates the data source, sample selection and descriptive statistics.  
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Chapter 4 exhibits the empirical methods and results  
Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings and also covers the research limitations and 














Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature on managerial compensation has been considered as a significant 
research field since the 1980s. However, managerial risk incentive through equity 
compensation is rather an undeveloped area until Core & Guay (2002) created the 
proper proxies to evaluate how equity compensation aligns managerial incentives and 
affect managerial risk attitudes. On the other hand, although secured debt has been 
widely studied as one of the crucial debt financing options, the linkage between 
secured debt and managerial risk incentives has rarely been explored. In order to 
discover this connection and find out the possible reason behind this connection, this 
chapter will begin with a comprehensive review of managerial incentive and secured 
debt followed by theoretical predictions on the connection between managerial 
risk-taking incentive and secured debt. Finally this chapter ends with the summary of 
all these studies, research gap and hypotheses.  
2.2 Literature on Managerial Risk Incentive and Corporate Policy Making  
2.2.1 Literature on Managerial Risk Incentive Estimation  
A. Relatively Rough Estimation of Managerial Risk Incentive in 1990s 
Managerial risk appetite influences corporate financial decision in an essential way 
over well known firm specific factors. Stock option is widely used in the managerial 
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compensation structure as an incentive to mitigate agency cost between managers and 
shareholders. Option value has sharply increased as part of managerial compensation 
in the past few years and firms are inclined to enhance the alignment between 
managerial risk incentive and firm performance.  
A growing body of literature focuses on the analysis of the effect of managerial 
incentive on corporate financial policies. Agrawal & Gershon (1987) find that firms 
with high stock and option ownership would engage in more variance-increasing 
acquisitions. DeFusco et al. (1990) argue that firms with granted stock option plan 
from 1978 to 1982 induced the increase in stock return variance. Lambert et.al (1991) 
argue that measuring the sensitivity of the managerial compensation change with 
respect to corporate performance variable change is preferred to assess managerial 
incentives.  
Mehran (1995), Tufano (1996), Berger et al. (1997), Schrand & Unal (1998) explore 
the link between managerial equity-based compensation and financial strategies such 
as leverage, stock repurchase, or the derivatives usage and hedging, but give different 
conclusions. Denis et al. (1997) examine the association between managerial stock 
holdings and corporate focus. So far, the literature related to managerial equity-based 
compensation before 2002 mainly use a relatively rudimentary proxy of option 
compensation as the explanatory variables such as scaled, unscaled, or transformed 
measures of value or number of option granted, stock vested or held, etc. These 
measures missed certain important characteristics which could be represented by later 
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advanced proxies (vega and delta) created by Core & Guay (2002).  
B. Managerial Option Portfolio Sensitivities Estimation by Core & Guay (2002) 
To estimate managerial risk incentives, Core & Guay (2002) computes two proxies, 
delta and vega, based on the stock and option holdings of executives. Delta, measures 
the sensitivity of executive option portfolio to firm stock price. That is how the value 
of managerial stock and option holdings could change with respect to 1% percent 
change in firm stock price. High delta suggests that managers are motivated by 
shareholders to make efforts to increase shareholders’ wealth. Compared with 
diversified outside shareholders, disproportionately large fraction of undiversified 
managers’ wealth is offered by firm, and the value of their human capital is tied with 
corporate performance (Fama, 1980; Smith & Stulz, 1985). Therefore, managers with 
high delta would probably prefer to take less risk when they make financial decisions. 
Delta is considered as a proxy of managerial risk-decreasing incentive.  
Vega measures how the value of managerial equity compensation changes with 
respect to 1% change in stock return volatility. It means that managers will benefit 
from risk-increasing policies since these policies induce stock return volatility. 
Therefore, vega is viewed as a managerial risk-increasing incentive.  
Gore & Guay (2002) suggests that sensitivity of executive option portfolio to stock 
return volatility is positively correlated with firm growth opportunities. Rajgopal & 
Shevlin (2002) find that the increased sensitivity of executive option portfolio to stock 
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return volatility could induce more risk-taking corporate policies and less risk 
aversion using a sample of firms in oil and gas industry. Rajgopal et al. (2004) 
indicate that greater sensitivity of managerial option compensation to stock volatility 
could lead to higher one year ahead stock return volatility. Coles et.al (2006) analyze 
the endogenous problem between executive stock option based compensation. They 
conclude that the sensitivity of CEO option compensation to stock volatility is highly 
correlated with leverage, R&D expenses and capital expenditures. Further, Knopf et al. 
(2002) propose that sensitivity of managerial option compensation to stock price gives 
manager incentive to take less risk. They find that managers with higher sensitivities 
of managerial option compensation to stock price tend to hedge more risk by using 
more derivatives. In addition, Chava & Purnanandam (2010) compare CEOs and 
CFOs in terms of their different influences of compensation incentives on corporate 
polices. They find that CEOs’ risk preferences through compensation structure are 
more likely to affect leverage ratio and cash holdings whereas debt maturity and 
accrual management are closely correlated with CFOs’ compensation incentives.  
All the reviewed literature indicates that sensitivities of executive option 
compensation have significant impact on corporate decision making.  
2.2.2 Literature on Managerial Risk Incentive and Corporate Debt Policy 
A. Risk Financing Theory in terms of Managerial Risk-taking Incentive and 
Corporate Debt Policy 
Recent studies have attempted to explore the link between managerial risk-taking 
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incentive and corporate debt financing. They found that risk financing theory provides 
an explanation for the connection between managerial risk-taking incentive and debt 
financing policies. Risk financing theory suggests that managerial risk-taking 
incentive could assist firms in adopting risky corporate debt policies.  
Cohen et al. (2000) conclude that leverage is positively correlated with CEO option 
portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Coles et.al (2006) posit the positive 
relation between managerial incentives through vega and leverage. They consider that 
managerial incentives and financial policies are jointly determined. For the 
endogeneity concern, they apply several econometric approaches to isolate the 
influence of vega on financial policies. They point out that the leverage is an essential 
way for firms to increase risk. Therefore firms with large managerial risk-increasing 
incentive would prefer high leverage. Their findings are consistent with risk financing 
theory. Firms with high vegas would favor high risk debt policies. 
Chava & Purnanandam (2007) explore the effect of managerial incentives along with 
market timing and firm characteristics on floating-fixed rate debt structure. They find 
managerial incentives have a strong influence on firm risk shift, which could induce 
firms to obtain variance-increasing debt structure. In addition, Chava & Purnanandam 
(2010) undertake an extensive study of the effect of managerial incentives on 
corporate policies. They find CEO risk-increasing incentive is correlated with higher 
leverage. They interpret this finding to suggest that CEOs intend to adopt higher 
leverage when they have risk-increasing preferences. In addition, they also find that 
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CFO risk-taking appetite is associated with shorter debt maturity. They explain that 
firms with shorter debt maturity face higher bankruptcy probability compared with 
firms with relatively longer debt maturity. In an extreme case, a firm with excessive 
shorter maturity debt probably is exposed to considerable refinancing risk as well as 
interest rate risk, which could induce large earning volatility. Therefore, shorter 
maturity would be the result of risk-taking incentive. 
All these studies indicate managerial incentives arising from equity-based 
compensation could affect firm debt financing policies. Firms with large managerial 
risk-taking incentive (vega) are more inclined to engage in risky debt policies, such as 
higher leverage, shorter maturity and higher floating debt ratio to maximize the firm 
value as well as the wealth of managers.  
To my knowledge, no study has explored the link between managerial risk-taking 
incentive and secured debt. If I follow the risk financing theory, the negative relation 
between secure debt and managerial risk-taking incentive should be expected since 
more secure debt will limit the firm’s ability to make risky financial and investment 
policies due to collateral burden. As argued by Jensen & Mecking (1976), and Coles 
et al. (2006) firms with risky managers would prefer aggressive corporate policies 
with more flexibility, so firms with higher managerial risk-taking incentives would 
use less secured debt.  
To sum up, risk financing theory predicts that the possibility to adopt risky financing 
policies increases in managerial risk-taking incentive. Above studies document that 
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CEO equity-based compensation facilitates firms to align CEOs’ interests with 
shareholders’. Therefore, CEOs with larger risk-increasing incentives (vega) intend to 
make risky financial decisions. Furthermore, capital structure and debt structure as the 
most important financial decisions probably reflect these risk-increasing incentives by 
adopting higher leverage ratio, shorter maturity or higher floating-to fixed debt ratio. 
As for secured debt, following the risk financing theory, firms with higher managerial 
risk-taking incentives would use less secured debt for the great amount of collaterals.  
B. Cost Contracting Theory in terms of Managerial Risk Incentives and Debt Policies  
Cost contracting theory suggests that if managerial risk-taking incentives could align 
managers’ interests with shareholders’, firms have more intention to engage in asset 
substitution to shift risk from firms to creditors, therefore agency costs between 
shareholders and creditors would be intensified, which could be revealed through cost 
of debt. To alleviate the agency cost, firms could use debt policies, such as more 
secured debt, shorter debt maturity, etc. The cost contracting theory predicts a positive 
relation between managerial risk-taking incentive and agency-cost reducing debt 
policies.  
Billett et al. (2006) examine stock and bond price reactions when CEOs are granted 
equity compensation for the first time. They find significant negative bond price 
reactions and large positive stock price reactions. Furthermore, to connect bond price 
reaction with managerial incentives, they find that bond price reaction decreases in 
CEO option portfolio sensitivity to stock volatility (vega) and stock price reaction 
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increase in risk-increasing vega when CEOs have little or no equity compensation 
prior to the grant. They suggest that, equity-based compensation probably aggravates 
shareholders-bondholders conflicts when it aligns managers’ interests with 
shareholders’. 
Shaw (2007) tries to examine the link between managerial incentives and cost of debt. 
The author uses various approaches to address the potential agency problem between 
shareholders and bondholders by evaluating the bond yields increase or decrease in 
managerial risk attitudes associated with equity-based compensation. The author finds 
that the cost of debt increases in risk-taking incentive. 
Brockman et.al (2010) find the positive (negative) relation between managerial risk 
incentive vega (delta) and short-maturity debt. They argue that firms with higher vega 
would bear more shareholders-creditors agency cost because managerial risk-taking 
incentive (vega) would align managerial incentive with shareholders’ interests on one 
side and enlarge agency cost between shareholders and bondholders on the other side. 
Therefore firms will obtain more short-maturity debt as a larger proportion of total 
debt to mitigate the agency cost when managerial risk-taking incentive (vega) is 
relatively high. They also find short-maturity debt could attenuate the impact of vega 
on bond yields.  
As explained in the cost contracting theory, intensified shareholders-creditors agency 
problem arising from managerial risk increasing incentive will be revealed and firms 
could adopt agency-cost reducing debt policies to mitigate this problem. The papers 
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above exhibit the evidences that CEO risk-taking incentive distorts creditors’ wealth 
in order to enhance shareholders’ benefits and firm value. Therefore, creditors react 
negatively to CEO risk-taking incentive (vega), and also the cost of debt measured in 
bond yield rises along with vega. In addition, firms with higher CEO vegas could 
adjust their debt structure, for example, adopting shorter debt maturity, as a solution to 
the exacerbated agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. These papers 
did not pay attention to secured debt that could serve as effective and efficient debt 
policy to decrease shareholders-creditors agency cost due to managerial risk-taking 
incentives.  
In conclusion, the influence of managerial risk-taking incentive through equity-based 
compensation on debt financing policies probably has two aspects. One is, as 
suggested by risk financing theory, that firms will adopt risky debt policies, such as 
higher leverage ratio, shorter maturity and lower secured debt ratio to align manager’s 
interest with shareholders’ risk-taking desire. The other is, as explained by the cost 
contracting theory, that firms could use certain debt policies, such as more secured 
debt, to mitigate agency cost when managerial risk-taking incentive puts a load on the 
relation between shareholders and bondholders, which suggests a positive impact of 
managerial risk-taking incentive on secured debt. 
All these studies consider the influence of managerial incentives on leverage, debt 
maturity, debt floating-to-fixed structure, whereas overlooking the connection 
between managerial incentives and secured debt ratio. In my work, I focus on the 
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relation between managerial risk-taking incentive and secured debt ratio, to find out 
how the agency problem affects this relation, further, I would like to explore the 
dominant theory that drives this relation, since both risk financing theory and cost 
contracting theory can be explanatory for the relation between managerial risk-taking 
incentive and secured debt ratio. 
In addition, it is easy to understand the usage of various debt structures other than 
secured debt to detect how agency cost change with managerial incentives when most 
studies are based on large sample size and cover a long period and broad industries. 
However, secured debt may not be well used in all of the industries due to the 
availability of collaterals. Therefore REIT industry with a large amount of securitized 
properties could be a better test bed to analyze the relations between secured debt and 
agency cost arising from managerial risk preference. 
2.2.3 Literature on the Impact of Managerial Risk Incentive on Financial Decisions in 
the context of REITs 
Feng et al. (2007) use 136 REITs in 2001 and find that REITs could have better 
financial performance with higher equity-based compensation. However, they purely 
consider stock ownership as the measurement of equity-based compensation which 
hardly reveals managerial incentives.  
Pennathur et al. (2005) examine the overall CEO compensation structure in REIT 
industry and they find that CEO compensation evaluation is correlated with REIT 
stock return performance and Fund From Operation. Further, they document the 
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negative relation between CEO compensation raise and CEO age. This study focuses 
on the influence of the stock return and firm performance on CEO total compensation. 
The author has not identified the distinguished feature of the equity-based portion of 
total compensation.  
Ertugrul et al. (2008) study the determinants of corporate hedging policies using the 
samples of REIT industry from 1999 to 2001. Executive wealth sensitivity to stock 
return volatility (Vega) and executive cash compensation are the key determinants of 
derivative use in REITs. 
In conclusion, CEO compensation incentives regarding CEO option portfolio 
sensitivities to stock price or volatility are rarely considered in REITs. In contrast, 
CEO cash compensation, CEO position in nominated committee and stock ownership 
as managerial entrenchment are always the focus of studies when interest conflicts 
between managers and shareholders are treated as the most serious agency problem. 
Therefore, the agency cost between shareholders and bondholders is largely missed in 
the circumstances when managers-shareholders agency problem is mitigated due to 
the sufficient provision of CEO option compensation.  
2.3 Literature on Secured Debt  
2.3.1 Literature on Secured Debt in Corporate Finance  
In corporate finance literature, debt always plays a crucial role in resolving agency 
conflicts whereas secured debt, especially association between secured debt and 
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managerial risk incentive through equity compensation, has not been comprehensively 
studied.  
Secured debt refers to debt collateralized by specific assets, in comparison with 
unsecured debt referring to general obligation bonds. Although secured and unsecured 
debt both look to firm’s interest and principle payment, when a firm confronts 
bankruptcy, secured debt holders have pledged assets which could be sold to cover 
their losses, therefore they take precedence over other creditors on the claim of firm’s 
assets.  
There are several reasons for firms to issue secured debt. First is the lower borrowing 
cost through the lower administration costs associated with secured debt and 
increasing the default cost. This is because the lender holds title to pledged assets 
which can be sold to reduce the losses associated with borrower default. Also, secured 
debt could help creditors to reduce the monitoring cost since their interests are 
guaranteed by the pledged assets (Shah & Thakor, 1987). Second, asset substitution 
problem could be alleviated by secured debt since pledged assets cannot be replaced 
or deposed without the permission of creditors. Further, the underinvestment problem 
is reduced with secured debt inclusion of total debt of firms, because firms with 
secured debt do not have to forgo positive but risky project since the profit arising 
from risky investment would not transfer to creditors, and meanwhile the interest rate 
of financing with secured debt is much lower than other types of debt (Stulz & 
Johnson, 1985; Berkovitch & Kim, 1990). Therefore, the utilization of secured debt 
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has a few advantages as an efficient financing policy. 
In contrast with the advantages, issuing secured debt certainly induces some cost. One 
is the sophisticated and expensive contracts associated with secured debt due to 
additional reporting requirement (Smith & Warner, 1979). Second is the lower 
flexibility regarding the use of pledged assets (Stulz & Johnson, 1985). Third, firms 
might have incentive to engage in excessive investment with lower cost of debt as the 
underinvestment problem is reduced, therefore, the overinvestment problem might be 
another concern of firm (Berkovitch & Kim, 1990). In conclusion, there are certain 
benefit and cost in terms of the utilization of secured debt. The decision to issue 
secured debt or not depends on the trade-off between the cost and benefit regarding 
secured debt issuing.  
A. Free Cash Flow Theory in terms of Secured Debt  
Free cash flow theory indicates that issuing secured debt could induce more cash flow, 
to facilitate firm financing and investment policies. Further, increased secured debt 
could raise the chance of overinvestment when it is treated to be an approach to 
decrease underinvestment problem. Leeth & Scott (1989) explain the widespread use 
of secured debt among the small business community in the US. By a limited 
dependent model, this study examines the influence of firm age and size, loan 
maturity and size, asset marketability, interest rates, and the legal environment on the 
firm’s decision to issue secured debt, and find that the incidence of secured debt is 
positively related with asset marketability, loan default probability, and loan maturity 
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and size. The study also indicates the significance of collateral in reducing costs of 
borrowing and producing cash flow for new investment in small business community. 
Berkovitch & Kim (1990) show that the issuing of secured debt can decrease 
underinvestment by restricting agency problems on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, it could generate extra cash flow with low cost of debt.  
If free cash flow theory stands, it means more secured debt could facilitate firms to 
involve in risky investment with free cash flow. So firms with managerial risk-taking 
incentives could utilize more secured debt and benefit from it, which indicates a 
positive relation between managerial risk-taking and secured debt. 
B. Secured Debt as an Agency-cost Reducing Approach 
Risk financing theory explains that the agency cost between shareholders and 
creditors could be decreased by various debt policies, such as secured debt. More 
secured debt will limit the flexibility for firm to engage in risky financing and 
investment policies. Due to the large amount of collaterals, debt security policy is not 
a good option to finance risky projects. If risky projects are proposed by firms with 
managerial risk-taking incentive, a negative correlation could be established between 
managerial risk-taking and secured debt ratio, as predicted by risk financing theory.  
The cost contracting theory, on the other hand, suggests secured debt could be an 
effective approach to mitigate agency cost between shareholders and creditors. Asset 
substitution problem is severe for firms with higher managerial risk-taking incentives. 
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High risky firms are more likely to substitute less risky assets with risky ones in order 
to maximize the profit for shareholders, and shift the earning volatility risk to 
creditors. To increase the ratio of secured debt could help restrict this problem since 
assets as collaterals cannot be transferred. Thus, secured debt could be an effective 
way to reduce agency cost arising from asset substitution problem when this problem 
is exacerbated because of managerial risk-taking incentives.  
There are a few key studies documenting the agency-cost reducing function of 
secured debt. Smith & Warner (1979) contend that including debt security provisions 
in the contract could limit the firm’s ability to engage in asset substitution. Barclay & 
Smith (1995) examine the priority structure of corporate liabilities among US 
industrial firms. This study finds that firms with high growth opportunities and 
risky-increasing preferences would tend to issue less secured debt.  
C. Connection between Managerial Risk-taking and Secured Debt 
So far, three theories have been discussed on either managerial risk-taking or secured 
debt. All three theories could interpret the impact of managerial risk-taking on secured 
debt ratio from different perspectives. As for risk financing theory, it predicts that 
secured debt ratio is negatively related to managerial risk-taking incentive, which 
means that firms with managerial risk-taking incentives are inclined to issue less 
secured debt to reserve their flexibilities whereas firms with managerial 
risk-decreasing appetites tend to pursue safe financing policy such as the utilization of 
more secured debt. The rationale is that if firms with risky managers have alternative 
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financing choices with less restrictive convents compared to secured debt, even 
associated with higher cost of debt, firms would probably prefer not to use secured 
debt, since they may are willing to take the chance when they prefer risky policy and 
meanwhile they have confidence in the return of new project. Therefore, secured debt 
ratio could inversely relate to managerial risk-taking incentive. 
Free cash flow theory, on the other hand, implies that secured debt ratio is positively 
associated with managerial risk-taking incentives. It means that firms with managerial 
risk-taking incentives tend to obtain more secured debt to reserve more cash flow with 
lower interest rate. Thus, firms with high managerial risk-taking incentives would like 
to use more secured debt2 and this policy would be favored by shareholders.  
Similarly, the cost contracting theory also indicates a positive impact of managerial 
risk-taking incentive on secured debt ratio. This theory suggests that firms with risky 
managerial appetites are more likely to take risky projects, the potential agency cost 
between creditors and shareholders would be intensified, therefore firms probably 
consider more attractive financing policies, such as to use more collaterals, to 
compensate creditors. Through this behavior, the asset substitution problem arising 
from increased shareholders-creditors agency conflicts can be reduced. If this 
                                                 
2 This study tries to explain the correlation between the utilization of secured debt and firm risk 
preference with agency cost theory. Secured debt is considered as part of debt priority structure. 
Here this work does not focus on credit market and the relation between lenders and borrowers. 
Certainly, in informational asymmetry theory, both positive and negative relations between 
secured debt and firm risk preference could be tested. 
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explanation holds, creditors could derive benefit from the increase in secured debt 
ratio. 
Obviously both free cash flow theory and cost contracting theory argue that the 
utilization of secured debt could increase in managerial risk-taking incentive. If a 
positive relation can be empirically verified, the only question is to find out which 
theory dominates the positive relation between secured debt ratio and managerial 
risk-taking appetite. 
A few studies with respect to secured debt focus on the collaterals to examine how the 
existence of collaterals would affect the relation between borrowers (firms) and 
lenders (creditors that have title to the collaterals). They use both adverse selection 
and moral hazard models to justify this relation
3
. These studies consider the 
collaterals, per se, when examining the relations between firms and collateral holding 
creditors. They come to different conclusions regarding the relation between firm 
performance and secured debt issuing. However, in this study I take secured debt ratio 
and the change of this ratio as financial policy to examine how managerial risk-taking 
incentive would affect this financial policy changes. Therefore, I consider all creditors, 
                                                 
3 From informational asymmetry perspective, less risky firm could provide more collaterals to 
signal good quality of firm in adverse selection model. If high risk preference increases the total 
risk of firm, one expects negative correlation between secured debt ratio and firm risk preference. 
While, the moral hazard model suggests the positive relation between secured debt ratio and firm 
risk preference, since firm with high risk preference would use more collaterals to show the 
determination to work hard to repay debt. Both positive and negative relations between secured 
debt and firm risk preference have been tested empirically.(Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), 
Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006),Inderst and Mueller (2007)) 
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not only the creditor with collaterals, and I employ neither adverse selection nor moral 
hazard models, whereas I emphasis how agency problems would be affected by the 
change of secured debt ratio.  
2.3.2 Literature on Secured Debt in context of REITs 
Brown & Riddiough (2003) find that REITs with large amounts of property could 
only or prefer only to use secured debt financing. Their explanation is consistent with 
the notion that unsecured debt financing would be more costly compared with equity, 
when firms have large amounts of secured debt outstanding.  
Ooi (2000) examines the incidence of secured debt among UK real estate companies. 
The author finds that the utilization of secured debt is negatively correlated with firm 
size but positively related to firm risk. Ambrose et al. (2010) test the relation between 
the utilization of secured debt and firm stock performance using the samples in REIT 
industry. They find a positive correlation between increased secured debt ratio and 
firm excess stock return in the following quarter. Also small firms and firms with high 
leverages are more likely to increase their secured debt ratio.  
To sum up, secured debt is widely used in REIT industry due to the availability of 
collaterals and relatively lower cost of debt. However, literature documents that small 
and high leverage firms opt for secured debt. Ambrose et al. (2010) argue that the 
moral hazard model provides the explanation for this relation. That means poor 
performance borrowers would have larger incentives to work hard to repay debt when 
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collaterals are provided.  
2.4 Hypotheses  
Following a large body of studies (e.g. Guay,1999; Coles et al.,2006), I compute CEO 
compensation incentives through the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio to stock 
return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio sensitivity to stock 
price (delta). My primary focus is on vega, and in this section I first explain three 
hypotheses about the impact of vega on secured debt ratio of firm. Following the 
hypotheses I discuss the likely influence of delta on secured debt ratio. 
2.4.1 Vega and Secured Debt Ratio 
There are three hypotheses with respect to the influence of vega on secured debt ratio. 
H1：Risky financing hypothesis  
Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue that firms could align managers’ interests with 
shareholders’ by enhancing managerial incentives using equity-based compensation. 
Coles et al. (2006) suggest that the risk of investment and financing policies increases 
in managerial option portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). Therefore, 
firms with higher vegas are inclined to make riskier investment through more 
aggressive debt policies with higher flexibility and fewer collaterals. Consequently, 
firms would decrease secured debt ratio and keep secured debt as a small proportion 
of total debt for firms with larger vegas. Thus, this hypothesis suggests: 
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H1: Secured debt ratio is negatively correlated with managerial option portfolio 
sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). 
On the other hand, theories also suggest secured debt ratio could be positively 
associated with risk-taking incentive (vega), whereas two different explanations could 
attribute to this relation. They are named as “Free cash flow hypothesis” and 
“Contracting cost hypothesis”.  
H2: Free cash flow hypothesis  
As suggested by Leeth & Scott (1989) and Berkovitch & Kim (1990), increasing 
secured debt could reduce the underinvestment problem. However, with increasing 
free cash flow and lower cost of debt, firms may not only finance the value-increasing 
and risk-reducing projects, but also the risky projects. If executives have risk-taking 
incentives which are aligned with shareholders’ benefits, firms with high risk-taking 
incentives would prefer more secured debt to make risky investment. Secured debt 
ratio will be positively correlated with managerial risk-taking incentive. Thus, this 
hypothesis suggests that secured debt ratio increases in managerial option portfolio 
sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). 
H3: Cost contracting hypothesis  
Barclay & Smith (1995), Brockman et al.(2010) and Billett et al. (2010) argue that, if 
managerial equity compensation is preferred and used by shareholders to mitigate the 
agency cost between managers and shareholders, the activities induced by managerial 
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risk-taking incentives could possibly enlarge the agency conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors. Firms with managerial risk-taking incentives are more 
likely to involve in asset substitution. If creditors detect the potential risk induced by 
managerial risk-taking incentives associated with equity-based compensation, they 
probably require more protection. Bond convents with senior claims such as secured 
debt should be a better way to restrict agency cost arising from asset substitution 
problem. On the other hand, firms may have to compensate the creditors by increasing 
secured debt ratio, to attenuate shareholders-creditors agency cost. In this case, 
secured debt ratio is also predicted to positively correlated with managerial option 
portfolio sensitivity vega. 
H2&H3: Secured debt ratio is positively correlated with managerial option 
portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega) 
Although both H2 and H3 come to the same conclusion on how secured debt ratio 
correlates with managerial risk-taking incentive (vega), I could distinguish them with 
a further test. That is to examine how excess stock return responds to the change of 
secured debt ratio associated with managerial compensation incentive. If the “Free 
cash flow hypothesis” holds, shareholders would benefit from the change of secured 
debt ratio associated with managerial risk-taking incentive because of increased free 
cash flow raised by less costly secured debt. On the other hand, if the “Contracting 
cost hypothesis” holds, shareholders would not favor the change of secured debt ratio 
correlated with managerial risk-taking incentive, since the change in secured debt 
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ratio aims to control the enlarged shareholders-creditors agency conflicts and this 
change would increase the cost of debt at expense of shareholders’ wealth. 
2.4.2 Delta and Secured Debt Ratio 
The effect of delta on corporate policy can be either positive or negative. On the one 
hand, Lambert et al. (1991), Carpenter (2000), and Ross (2004) argue that a 
risk-averse and under-diversified manager has a strong incentive to adopt 
risk-decreasing policies if a CEO has high option portfolio sensitivity to stock price. 
This suggests that higher delta represents high risk aversion incentive. On the other 
hand, if high delta compensation enhances the alignment between managers and 
shareholders, shareholders’ risk preferences would be intensified whatever they are 
risk-taking or risk-reducing. Delta would possibly reveal risk-increasing incentive. 
Thus, delta could represent either risk-increasing or risk-decreasing incentive, and the 
impact of delta on any corporate policy, including secure debt ratio, is uncertain. That 
is why this work focuses on managerial risk-taking incentive (vega) rather than delta, 
to address how managerial risk incentive affects secured debt ratio. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter first presents a review of current studies regarding managerial 
compensation incentives and secured debt, and specifically focuses on REIT literature 
on managerial incentives and secured debt. 
In corporate finance literature, managerial incentives and secured debt are both widely 
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explored. Managerial incentives through equity-based compensation have recently 
advanced and extensively studied. Vega, which is managerial option portfolio 
sensitivity to stock return volatility, is viewed as managerial risk-taking incentive 
proxy. Quite a few studies have examined how this incentive affects corporate policy, 
especially debt financing policies in terms of agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. The risk financing theory suggests that managerial risk-taking 
incentives will encourage firms to take risky policies to increase the earning variance. 
So risk financing theory is the first theory which provides a good explanation on how 
risk-taking incentive connects with secured debt. On the other hand, very few studies 
look into the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and corporate policies 
to reveal agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors. The cost contracting 
theory implies that a few debt policies, such as secured debt or debt maturity, could be 
used to reduce the increased agency cost between shareholders and creditors arising 
from managerial risk-taking incentive. Therefore, cost contracting theory is the 
second theory which could reveal the relation between secured debt and managerial 
risk-taking incentive. 
The studies of secured debt could date back to the 1980s. Although theoretical studies 
have confirmed the function of secured debt to alleviate shareholders-creditors agency 
problem, very few empirical evidences could support this point. Whereas the majority 
of studies regarding secured debt focus on the determinants of the incidence of 
secured debt, the information asymmetry with collaterals, or correlation between 




, however, this proxy is a relatively raw proxy compared with the current 
managerial option portfolio sensitivities. All of these studied did not connect 
managerial incentives with secured debt. When exploring the theories regarding 
secured debt and firm risk appetites, and relating it to managerial incentive, I found 
that the free cash flow theory could help to establish the linkage between secured debt 
and managerial risk-taking incentive. The free cash flow theory indicates that firms 
with managerial risk-taking incentives could utilize more secured debt to generate 
extra cash flow for risky projects. Hence, free cash flow theory is the third one, 
besides risk financing and cost contracting theories, to explore the impact of 
managerial risk-taking incentive on secured debt. 
In the context of REITs, very few studies consider managerial incentives through 
equity compensation, on the other hand, large proportion of literature tend to use the 
number of managerial stock and option ownership, number of restricted stock, or cash 
compensation, etc, to explain how equity compensation affects firm value or 
corporate policies. These studies focus on REIT corporate governance and the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers, such as how to obtain efficient 
compensation structure, or whether the existing compensation would lead to 
entrenched management. In terms of secured debt, there are several studies which 
have examined the incidence of secured debt, and the relation between firm 
                                                 
4 Ooi(2000) contends that stock ownership is one of the determinates of the incidence of secured debt. 
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performance and secured debt in REIT industry, whereas they have not explored the 
association between secured debt and managerial incentives.  
With the existing research gap and different theoretical predictions, three hypotheses 
are developed, “Risk financing hypothesis” predicts a negative relation between 
managerial risk-taking and secured debt, whereas “Free cash flow hypothesis” and 
“Cost contracting hypothesis” indicate the positive impact of managerial risk-taking 
on secured debt ratio. In the following chapters, the data analysis and empirical results 
will be presented in detail based on above literature review. 
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Chapter 3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter defines variables, analyzes data, and demonstrates the detailed 
calculation process of key variables. Section 3.2 presents data source and sample 
selection. Section 3.3 provides the definition on the variables. Section 3.4 illustrates 
descriptive statistics. The last section is the summary of this chapter.  
3.2 Data sources and Sample Selection  
I construct two samples to test the main hypotheses, namely, secured debt sample (to 
test H1), and excess return sample (to test H2 & H3). I draw archival data from 
various sources to construct the secured debt sample. Speciﬁcally, I collect CEO 
compensation data from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. Financial 
accounting and stock return information come from COMPUSTAT annual ﬁles and 
CRSP monthly ﬁles, respectively. I use annual data for both of the samples. 
I construct the secured debt sample by identifying the CEO of each ﬁrm in 
ExecuComp from 2001 to 2009. I require that all necessary information be available 
to compute the price and volatility sensitivities of the CEO option portfolio as well as 
the CEO stock ownership. I chose 2001 as the start year, because the data that is 
required to compute vega is not available in ExecuComp or COMPUSTAT databases 
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for most of REITs prior to 2001. The sample size in each year before 2001 is too 
small (less than five) to be included.  
After I obtain CEO sensitivities, vega and delta, I match the original sample to 
financial accounting data and stock information in COMPUSTAT and CRSP. I delete 
six observations with missing data items and error items (e.g. secured debt ratio is 
lower than 0% and higher than 100%). To eliminate the effect of outliers, I winsorize 
CEO option portfolio sensitivities at 1% and 99% of empirical distribution. My ﬁnal 
sample contains 360 ﬁrm-year observations. 
To construct the excess return sample, I compute the annual change of secured debt 
ratio and excess stock return. Stock return data is derived from CRSP monthly return 
files. Excess return is based on the difference between firm stock return and matched 
portfolio return. The final sample contains 294 ﬁrm-year observations from 2001 to 
2009.  
3.3 Variable Descriptions  
3.3.1 Dependent Variables: Secured Debt Ratio & Excess Return  
To isolate the collateralization decision from leverage decision, I normalize the 
amount of secured debt by its total debt. I measure annual secured debt ratio and 
change in the secured debt ratio as:  
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𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡 ÷ 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡  
∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡=𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 
Compared with secured debt ratio calculation, the computation of excess return is a 
rather complicated approach. Following the methodology in Faulkender & Wang 
(2006), excess return is the difference between firm stock return from t-1 to year t, 
and constructed REIT size and book-to-market matched portfolio return from year t-1 
to year t.  
REIT size and book-to-market portfolios are constructed following Fama & French 
(1993, 1995). In each year, I firstly divide all observations into four groups based on 
their sizes, the bottom 25% (small), 25%-50% (less small), 50%-75% (less big), 
above 75% (big). Secondly, I break each group into two subgroups based on their 
market-to-book ratios, above median (high), below median (low). Therefore in each 
year I have eight groups according to the interaction between size and market-to-book 
sorts. Thirdly, I compute the mean return of each group in every year to obtain the 
benchmark returns. Next I match every firm in my sample into one of the eight size 
and market-to-book portfolios. Finally, the excess return of each firm in each year is 
the difference between firm stock return from year t-1 to year t, and benchmark return 
of matched REIT portfolio from year t-1 to year t. 
EXCESS RETURNi,t  = ri,t − 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡
𝐵  
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3.3.2 Treatment Variables: CEO Option Portfolio Sensitivities Delta and Vega  
I deﬁne CEO option portfolio sensitivity to stock price (delta) as the change in the 
value of CEO stock and option portfolio in response to 1% change in the price of 
common stock. CEO option portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega) is 
similarly deﬁned as the change in the value of CEO option portfolio due to 1% change  
in the annualized standard deviation of firm stock return. Partial derivatives of option 
price with respect to stock return volatility (vega) and stock price (delta) are based on 
Black & Scholes (1973) option pricing model adjusted for dividends by Merton 
(1973). I follow Core & Guay (2002) in calculating vega and delta, consistent with 
recent papers including Yermack (1995), Hall & Liebman (1998), Aggarwal & 
Samwick (2006), Cohen, et al. (2000), Datta et al. (2005), and Rajgopal & Shevlin 
(2002).  
The modified Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model describes the ways to 
compute CEO option portfolio sensitivities to stock price and sensitivity to stock 
return volatility. Merton (1973) modified Black- Scholes model (1973) and added 
dividends to option value calculation. The following equation shows the modified 
Black-Sholoes model, and all the characters are defined in Table 3.1.  
OPTION VALUE = [Se−dT N Z − Xe−rT N  Z − σT 
1
2
  ] 
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Table 3.1 Definitions of the Characters in modified B-S model 
Z  LN  
S
X
 + T  r − d +
σ2
2





N Cumulative probability function of the normal distribution 
S Firm fiscal year close stock price 
X Exercise price of option 
σ Expected stock return volatility over 60 months 
R Natural logarithm of risk-free interest rate 
T Option time to maturity of option in years 
D 
Natural logarithm of expected dividend yield of certain fiscal year, 
which is the company’s average dividend yield over the past 3 years 
DELTA, the sensitivity of option value to 1% change in stock price is:  
 
∂ OPTION VALUE 
∂ PRICE 
 ×  
PRICE
100




VEGA, the sensitivity of option value with respect to 1% change in stock return 
volatility is:  
 
∂ OPTION VALUE 
∂ STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
 ×  
1
100
 = e−dT  N′ Z ST 
1
2




where N′  is the normal density function. 
The six variables required to compute delta and vega are exercise price of the option, 
time to maturity, stock return volatility, risk-free rate, dividend yield, and stock price. 
All these variables can either be found in databases or accurately estimated. I use 
ExecComp data for stock return volatilities (item BS_VOLAT in ExecuComp), 
risk-free rates (item RISK_FRE in ExecuComp), dividend yields (item BS_YIELD in 
ExecuComp) and stock prices (item PRCCF in ExecuComp). Since the exercise prices 
and time to maturities are not fully disclosed in ExecuComp, I follow Core and 
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Cuay’s (2002) methodology, which is proved to explain 90% of actual variation in 
stock option portfolio sensitivities.  
I divide option portfolio into three parts: (1) new granted options (2) exercisable 
previous options and (3) unexercisable previous options. For new granted options, 
ExecuComp dataset provides sufficient information on the exercise prices (item 
EXPRIC in ExecuComp) and time to maturities (item EXDATE in ExecuComp). 
However, no data is available on exercise prices and time to maturities in ExecuComp 
dataset for previous granted options. Therefore, I use “realizable values” noted in 
Core & Guay (2002) to estimate the exercise prices of CEO options.  
I divide realizable value by the number of options to find out how much stock price is 
above exercise price. The exercise price is stock price minus the quotient. For 
exercisable previous options, the realizable value is denoted by INMONEX in 
ExecuComp and the number of exercisable options is UEXNUMEX in ExecuComp. 
For unexercisable previous options, the realizable value is INMONUN in ExecuComp 
and the number of unexercisable options is UEXNUMUN in ExecuComp. I adjust the 
number of unexercisable options when CEO has new granted options in that year, 
since new granted options are included in the reported number of unexercisable 
options. 
When estimating time to maturities for previously granted options (exercisable and 
unexercisable), I consider the time to maturity of an unexercisable option is one year 
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shorter than the maturity of a new grant option. This assumption is consistent with 
Kole (1997) that shows vesting periods are 24 months on average. Meanwhile, I 
assume the time to maturity of an exercisable option is three years shorter than 
maturity of an unexerciable option. This is explained by Core & Guay (2002). They 
argue that three year difference is appropriate due to early managerial option exercises 
(expected time to exercise is less than time to maturity). Therefore, the time to 
maturity of an unexercisable (exercisable) option is the time to maturity of a new 
grant minus one (four). If no option is granted in current year, time to maturity of  an 
unexercisable (exercisable) option is six (nine) years. This assumption is based on the 
evidence that most options have 10 year maturities (Core & Guay, 2002; Brockman et. 
al, 2010). 
Once the deltas and vegas for both new and previous grant options are properly 
estimated, I could calculate CEO option portfolio delta and CEO option portfolio vega 
as the following equations.  
DELTA of CEO option portfolio: 
DELTAP = DELTANG + DELTAPGEX + DELTAPGUN + DELTASTOCK  
VEGA of CEO option portfolio: 
VEGAP = VEGANG + VEGAPGEX + VEGAPGUN  
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P denotes option portfolio. NG, PGEX, PGUN and STOCK stand for new grants, 
previously granted exercisable options, previously granted unexercisable options, and 
CEO stock holdings, respectively.  
As shown in the above equations, delta of option portfolio is the sum of deltas for new 
granted option, previous exercisable option, previous unexercisable option and stock 
holdings. Vega of option portfolio is the sum of vegas for new grants, previous 
exercisable and previous unexercisable options.  
Here I compute delta of CEO stock holdings as the following equation. Vega of CEO 
stock holdings is not considered, since vega of stock holding seems immaterial 
consistent with Coles et. al (2006). 
DELTASTOCK = Number of stock owned by CEO SHROWN in ExecuComp × 0.01
× Endof year stock price(PRCCF in ExecuComp) 
3.3.3 Control Variables 
I choose control variables based on previous secured debt literature. Earlier studies 
analyze the relation between secured debt ratio and firm size (LSIZE–in logs), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), market-to-book (M/B), abnormal earnings (ABNEARN), 
firms with S&P credit ratings (RATING), firm Altman (1977) Z-score (ZSCORE). 
More detailed definitions and data sources for all variables are provided in Appendix 
A. All these variables are used in previous related literature, such as Leeth & Scott 
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(1989), Barclay & Smith (1995), Ooi (2001), among others. 
3.3.4 Instrument Variables 
I use a few instruments for vega and delta in two stage least square regression model. 
The instruments include firm age, CEO age, and CEO tenure and CEO cash 
compensation ratio. Firm age in a given sample year is the number of years since the 
first year that the firm is reported in COMPUSTAT. CEO age is the age of CEO 
reported in ExecuComp database and CEO tenure is the number of years that current 
CEO has served in that capacity as reported in ExecuComp database. Cash 
compensation ratio is sum of CEO salary and bonus scaled by total compensation. 
These instruments for vega and delta are also used by Coles et al. (2006) and 
Brockman et al. (2010). Appendix A provides more descriptions for these instruments. 
3.4 Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics 
Table 3.2 shows the time series distribution of secured debt ratio, CEO option 
portfolio sensitivities to stock price (LNDELTA-delta in logs) and CEO option 
portfolio sensitivities to stock return volatility (LNVEGA-vega in logs) and leverage. 
For the right skewness of the distributions of vega and delta, natural logarithm 
transformations are used in the empirical tests. The sample contains 360 observations 
and covers the periods from 2001 to 2009. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. 
There is an upward trend in the use of secured debt from 2001 until 2005, followed by 
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a general decline, then reach the highest median value of 52% in 2009. Secured debt 
ratio obtains its lowest median value of 38% in 2001. Similarly the average sensitivity 
of CEO option portfolio to 1% change in stock return volatility (LNVEGA) rises from 
2.469 in 2001 to the high value of 3.138 in 2005, and later reaches the peak at 3.242 
in 2009 as secured debt ratio. As described in our hypothesis development section, an 
increase in vega increases CEO risk appetite, which possibly induce the increase in 
secured debt ratio (See “Free cash flow hypothesis” and “Cost contracting 
hypothesis”). Here coincidentally I find that secured debt ratio increases or decreases 
with vega. On the contrary, the fluctuations of LNDELTA and leverage have not 
exhibited the same trend over my sample period. 
Table 3.2 Sample Distribution 
This table shows the time series distribution for the sample. In each year, the number of 
REITs is in column two. The average secured debt ratio of all REITs in given year is shown in 
column three. In the following columns, I exhibit the mean value of LNVEGA, LNDELTA 
and leverage across firms in each year. The sample contains 360 observations and covers the 






LNVEGA LNDELTA LEVERAGE 
2001 16 0.380 2.469 4.099 0.363 
2002 22 0.454 2.694 4.460 0.373 
2003 30 0.448 2.692 4.105 0.321 
2004 30 0.476 3.011 4.342 0.295 
2005 32 0.487 3.138 4.095 0.312 
2006 54 0.474 2.920 3.529 0.317 
2007 57 0.453 2.618 3.269 0.370 
2008 59 0.416 2.387 3.357 0.453 
2009 60 0.520 3.242 3.367 0.373 
In Table 3.3A, summary statistics are presented for all dependent and independent 
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variables in the regressions. The first dependent variable secured debt ratio has a 
mean value of 46.2%, and the second dependent variable, excess return, has a mean 
value of -0.0001. Turning to the treatment variables, again, natural logarithm 
transformations are used in the empirical tests due to the right-skewed distributions of 
vega and delta. LNDELAT has a median of 4.4290 and LNVEGA has a median of 
3.0270. The statistics for both treatment variables are similar to Coles et al. (2006). 
They compute the medians of delta and vega are 206 and 34 in absolute value, taking 
natural logarithm, the medians of LNDELAT and LNVEGA are around 5.3279 and 
3.5264 respectively. In Table 3.3B, detailed statistics for delta and vega 
decomposition are provided to make a better understanding of original delta and vega. 
Table 3.3A Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables in the 
regressions. The sample includes 360 observations and covers the period from 2001 to 2009. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variable Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Std.Dev N 
SECURED DEBT RATIO 0.4624 0.1935 0.4023 0.7415 0.3123 360 
EXCESS RETURN -0.0001 -0.0072 -0.0001 0.0071 0.0201 360 
LNDELTA 3.6610 0.0842 4.4290 5.7800 2.6720 360 
LNVEGA 2.6920 0.0000 3.0270 4.7400 2.2530 360 
LNSIZE 8.3860 7.6950 8.3690 9.0020 0.9048 360 
MTB 1.3400 1.1530 1.3080 1.4870 0.2750 360 
LEVERAGE 0.3619 0.2892 0.3616 0.4347 0.1356 360 
ABNORMALEARN -0.0156 -0.0108 0.0005 0.0091 0.1948 360 
ZSCORE 1.9100 0.7077 1.0120 1.4010 4.569 360 
RATING 6.7890 -1.0000 10.0000 11.0000 5.8130 360 
PricetoFFO  14.1000 9.7000 12.5000 15.8000 24.5000 360 
FIRM AGE 21.0000 16.0000 17.0000 24.0000 10.0000 360 
CEO AGE 52.0000 47.0000 51.0000 56.0000 7.7650 360 
TENURE 5.4362 2.0000 5.0000 9.0000 5.4242 360 
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CASHCOMP_RATIO 0.4237 0.2062 0.3726 0.6145 0.2725 360 
Table 3.3B Descriptive Statistics of DELTA and VEGA Decomposition 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for delta and vega decomposition in original form 
(before natural logarithm transformation). P denotes option portfolio. NG, PGEX, PGUN and 
STOCK stand for new grants, previously granted exercisable options, previously granted 
unexercisable options, and CEO stock holdings, respectively. The sample includes 360 
observations and covers the period from 2001 to 2009.  
Variable($000) Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Std.Dev N 
DELTANG 23.7528 5.4102 14.0547 26.0239 31.1743 360 
DELTAEX 57.9458 4.9626 24.9978 84.3580 76.5963 360 
DELTAUN 228.7001 34.9142 76.4735 159.6129 503.1428 360 
DELTASTOCK 810.8894 32.1204 121.8691 384.5137 3470.4290 360 
DELTAp 816.9410 32.1204 163.2888 446.9397 3253.8560 360 
VEGANG 1.3400 1.1530 1.3080 1.4870 0.2750 360 
VEGAEX 0.3619 0.2892 0.3616 0.4347 0.1356 360 
VEGAUN 35.9587 10.4499 21.6622 43.6445 43.9927 360 
VEGASTOCK 91.9160 4.0898 41.9231 131.6555 128.0958 360 
VEGAP 151.9873 26.3124 65.0565 108.8831 292.5760 360 
In Table 3.4, I examine the correlation among secured debt ratio, LNDELTA, 
LNVEGA and other firm characteristics. It is shown that LNDELTA and LNVEGA 
are significantly correlated with coefficient of 0.7736. Thus, it is crucial to control 
LNDELTA when I consider the effect of LNVEGA on the dependent variables. 
Table 3.4 Correlation between Secured Debt Ratio, LNDELAT, LNVEGA and 
Firm Characteristics 
This table shows the correlation between managerial incentives (LNVEGA, LNDELTA) and 
firm characteristics. The sample contains 360 observations from 2001 to 2009. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * are used to indicate that the coefficient is 












LNDELTA -0.1126 1.0000 
 
LNVEGA -0.0513    0.7736*** 1.0000 
LNSIZE    -0.3365***    0.5183***    0.5249*** 
MTB    -0.1391***    0.1008***    0.1111*** 
LEVERAGE    0.1141*** 0.0725 -0.0354 
ABNORMALEARN 0.0398 0.0088 0.0763 
ZSCORE 0.0603 -0.0330 0.0617 
RATING    -0.5615***    0.4364***    0.4933*** 
PricetoFFO -0.0107    0.0671    0.0592 
FIRM AGE 0.0218  0.0841 0.1184 
CEO AGE -0.0458   -0.1630**   -0.1459** 
TENURE 0.0268 -0.0027   -0.1428** 
CASHCOMP_RATIO -0.0140   -0.1734**    -0.3189*** 
Figure 3.1 displays the scatter plot of average firm secured debt ratios and within firm 
standard deviations of secured debt ratios. The idea behind this presentation is to see 
if variations in secured debt ratios are common or if firms rarely adjust secured debbt 
ratio. It is clear from Figure 3.1 that few firms target particular secured debt ratios and 
do not change their ratios (note the low volatilities around 0% and 100%). 
However, this figure reveals that many REITs do have wide variations in secured debt 
ratios over the sample. Figure 3.1 provides sufficient variability that makes the 
analysis of secured debt ratio meaningful. 
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Figure 3.1 Scatter Plot of Within Firm Secured Debt Ratio and Secured Debt 
Ratio Volatility 
To have a better understanding of the distributions of LNDELTA and LNVEGA, Fig 
3.2 and Fig 3.3 are provided. Fig 3.3 and Table 3.3 seem to indicate that LNVEGA of 
REITs has relatively larger mean and variance compared with other sectors. In 
Brockman et. al (2010), the sample includes industrial firms with SIC codes from 
2000 to 5999, which excludes REITs (SIC code: 6798). According to their statistic 
description, mean of LNVEGA is 1.108, variance is 1.913.Also 25 percentile, median 
and 75 percentile are all smaller than those in Table 3.3. Similar result can be obtained 
when I compare LNVEGA of this work with others (Chava & Purnanandam, 2010; 
Coles et. al, 2006). This result might suggest that REITs has larger LNVEGA than 
other sectors. Since LNVEGA represents managerial risk-taking incentive, higher 
LNVEGA means that REITs might have higher managerial risk-taking incentives than 
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compensation and risk-taking incentive when other works exclude REITs in their 
samples. 
 
Figure 3.2 Scatter Plot of Within Firm LNDELTA Mean and Standard Deviation 
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This chapter introduces data sources and sample selection, variable descriptions and 
summary statistics. More importantly, this chapter descries the detailed calculation 
processes of key independent and dependent variables. Through the careful 
examination of variables, the key variable, LNVEGA of REITs is found to have 
higher value and higher variance than other sectors, which make the test of REIT 
managerial risk-taking incentive through LNVEGA more different and interesting. In 
order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the influence of compensation 
incentives on secured debt, careful empirical design and result interpretations will be 
followed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 Empirical Methods and Results  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I try to explore the relation between managerial risk-taking and 
secured debt through random effect analysis, two stage least square estimation, and 
change-in-variable analysis. In order to find out the reason behind the impact of 
managerial risk-taking on secured debt, I examine the wealth effect of managerial 
risk-taking incentive associated with secured debt ratio change. With all these careful 
estimations, I expect to understand the impact of managerial risk-taking on secured 
debt from different perspectives, to ascertain the dominant theory that mainly affects 
this relation and the rationale behind it.  
4.2 Secured Debt Ratio and CEO Managerial Risk-taking Incentives 
4.2.1 Random Effect Analysis 
I estimate the following panel regression of secured debt ratio on executive 
compensation incentives: 
SECURED DEBT RATIOi,t  = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 LNVEGAi,t  + 𝑎2 LNDELTAi,t + 𝑎3 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t +
            𝑎4 MTBi,t + 𝑎5 LEVERAGEi,t  + 𝑎6 𝐴𝐵𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁i ,t +  𝑎7𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 +
            𝑎8 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀i,t………………………………………………....(1) 
Random effect analysis is a better estimation compared with fixed effect estimation. 
The Hausman test is conducted to make sure that random effect estimation is 
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consistent and efficient. With 8 degree of freedom, the Chi2(8) equals 15.92, which 
means the P-value is 0.0519. So it is larger than 0.05 and random effect is efficient. 
All the independent variable other than vega and delta have been used in previous 
literature (Leeth & Scott, 1989; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Ooi, 2001; Ambrose et al., 
2010). In Table 4.1, the results of the panel regression from Equation (1) are reported. 
Model 1 includes all control variables and both CEO portfolio sensitivities 
(LNDELTA and LNVEGA).The result of Model 1 supports H2 & H3 (“Free cash flow 
hypothesis” and “Cost contracting hypothesis”) by showing the positive and 
significant estimated coefficient of LNVEGA (0.0212). This result indicates that 
secured debt ratio increases in CEO option portfolio sensitivity to stock price 
(LNVEGA). The estimated coefficient of LNDELTA is positive but not significant. 
Further in Model 2, only LNVEGA plus all control variables are included. The result 
of Model 2 also shows the positive and significant coefficient of LNVEGA (0.0315), 
which confirms the result of Model 1. I have to separately test the two compensation 
incentives due to the high correlations between the two proxies. Both Model 1 and 
Model 2 imply that secured debt ratio is positively related to managerial risk-taking 
incentive (LNVEGA).  
The positive relation between secured debt ratio and LNVEGA is not only statistically 
significant but also economically significant. For instance, through the estimated 
coefficient on LNVEGA in Model 1 and statistics of sample used to estimate Table 
3.3, one standard deviation increase in LNVEGA increases secured debt ratio by 
0.0478 (2.253*0.0212) or about 10.33% (based on the sample mean of secured debt 
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ratio (0.4624)). 
Besides the main variable of interest, LNVEGA, this regression also yields the 
consistent results for control variables. Most of the control variables are statistically 
significant and display the expected signs similar to previous studies (Leeth & Scott, 
1989; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Ooi, 2001). 
Firm size is a key variable in explanation of secured debt ratio. Specifically, small 
firms are more likely to use secured debt. Several studies have demonstrated this 
relation (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Ooi, 2001). The main reason is that small firms have 
fewer options but to issue secured debt whereas large firms have more choices of 
finance instruments. Following Barclay & Smith (1995) and others, I use the market 
value of the firm as a measure of ﬁrm size. Similar to Barclay & Smith (1995), I 
found the significant negative relation between LNSIZE and secured debt ratio.  
ABNORMALEARN is used to proxy the quality of firm (Barclay & Smith, 1995; 
Stohs & Mauer, 1996). Good quality firms probably provide more secured debt to 
signal the credit worthiness to the lenders when lenders have less information about 
borrowers (Chan & Kanatas, 1985; Besanko & Thakor, 1987; Chan & Thakor, 1987; 
Igawa & Kanatas, 1990). Also, with the less probability of default, firms could enjoy 
high interest rate benefits with lower expected loss of collaterals. So secured debt 
offering is more valuable for high quality firm than low quality firms. Following 
(Barclay & Smith, 1995), good quality firms are more likely to have high positive 
abnormal returns. Therefore, the positive relation is expected between abnormal 
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earning and secured debt ratio. This result supports the adverse selection model.  
MTB is expected to be inversely related to secured debt ratio. Previous research (such 
as Barclay & Smith, 1995), indicates firms with more growth opportunities tend to 
obtain fewer secured debt. The result is consistent with the literature but insignificant.  
LEVERAGE is certainly an important factor regarding debt structure and debt 
security policy. The positive coefficient implies that the default possibility increases 
in leverage ratio, so the value of secured debt will increase in leverage ratio. Hence, 
firms with higher leverage ratio will intend to issue more secured debt (Stulz & 
Johnson, 1985). 
ZSCORE exhibits a negative coefficient which is consistent with prediction. 
ZSCORE evaluates firm financial distress status, so firms with high scores will tend 
to use less secured debt when they have other options and more flexibility.  
RATING also inversely correlates with secured debt ratio. As suggested by Leeth & 
Scott (1989), secured debt value increases in probability of default. Firms with lower 
the credit rating tend to have higher the probability of bankruptcy. Thus, credit rating 
decreases in secured debt ratio. That means firms would like to utilize more secured 
debt when they have lower credit rating. ZSCORE and RATING are both negatively 
correlated with secured debt ratio, which align with moral hazard model. Low quality 
firms are more willing to work hard to pay off debt. Therefore secured debt provides 
more incentive for low quality firms and they would use more secured debt to show 
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their efforts and commitments
5
.  
Table 4.1 Relation between Secured Debt Ratio and CEO Portfolio Price 
/Volatility Sensitivities 
This table shows the result of random effect of panel data for 360 observations from 2001 to 
2009. Model 2 only includes LNVEGA as proxy of managerial incentive. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. I use ***, **, and * to indicate the coefficient is significantly different 






Model 1 Model 2 





LNVEGA + 0.0205** 0.0325*** 
 
 (-1.99) (-2.83) 
LNSIZE - -0.0901*** -0.0824*** 
 
 (-3.34) (-3.10) 
MTB - -0.0402 -0.0527 
 
 (-0.138) (-0.87) 
LEVERAGE + 0.102 0.128 
 
 (-0.72) (-0.91) 
ABNORMALEARN +/- 0.203*** 0.200*** 
 
 (-4.1) (-4.04) 
ZSCORE +/- -0.0052** -0.0055** 
 
 (-1.99) (-2.07) 
RATING +/- -0.0270*** -0.0289*** 
 
 (5.88) (4.45) 
INTERCEPT  1.2135*** 1.1480*** 
 
 (-4.52) (-4.78) 
PROPERTY TYPE  Yes Yes 
N  360 360 
R
2
adj  0.182 0.178 
4.2.2 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Estimation 
Model 3 in Table 4.2B helps to alleviate endogeneity concern through two-stage-least 
                                                 
5 In this study, I found evidences for both adverse selection model (ABNORMALEARN) and moral hazard model 
(ZSCORE and RATING). As argued in Ambrose et al. (2010), both models could possibly explain the usage of 
secured debt. I have no conclusion and preference on either of them. 
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square estimation. In first stage, I regress LNVEGA on all of the control variables 
used in Table 4.1 plus CEO cash compensation ratio (cash compensation/total 
compensation) and firm age. For LNDELTA, I use all the control variables in Table 
4.1 along with CEO age and tenure (See Table 4.2A). As it is shown in Table 4.2A, 
cash compensation is negatively correlated with LNVEGA, which means that when 
firms granted more cash and less equity compensation to CEOs, they will tend to be 
less risky since they already receive their payment by cash. The cash compensation 
would reduce CEOs risk-taking incentive. In contrary, CEOs with more equity 
compensation have higher risk-taking incentives since they are willing to take risk to 
increase their income through higher stock volatility and equity compensation. For 
LNDELTA, CEO tenure and age are both positively related to LNDELTA, because 
CEOs with longer tenure and older age tend to be less risky. They would like to take 
less risky policies to keep their positions by lower the volatilities of stock returns. 
Hence, after first stage, I obtained different and interesting factors that affect 
LNDELTA and VEGA. Also the predicted value of LNDELTA and LNVEGA are 
obtained. 
With predicted values of LNVEGA and LNDELTA, I run the same regressions as 
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 4.1 to yield new results. Model 3 reports these results 
where LNVEGA and LNDELTA are replaced by their predicted values from first 
stage regressions. As seen in Table 4.2B, LNVEGA continues to show a positive and 
significant impact on secured debt ratio, consistent with Model 1 and Model 2. In 
Model 4, when LNDELTA is excluded, LNVEGA still exhibits the same positive and 
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significant coefficient.  
Table 4.2A Relation between Secured Debt Ratio and CEO portfolio 
Price/Volatility Sensitivities: First Stage Regression of 2SLS 
This table shows the first stage of 2SLS estimation. Both predicted values of LNDELTA and 
LNVEGA as estimated in this table. The predicted LNVEGA is calculated from the first stage 
regression, when LNVEGA is regressed on executive cash compensation, firm age and all 
other firm characteristics. Similarly, the predicted LNDELAT is regressed on CEO age, tenure 
and all other firm characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix A. I use ***, **, and * 




Predicted LNVEGA Predicted LNDELTA 
CASHCOMP -0.5812**  
 (-2.33)  
FIRMAGE 0.0152  
 (0.60)  
LNSIZE 0.1049 0.5040*** 
 (0.77) (2.84) 
LEVERAGE -2.5350*** -1.0150 
 (-2.97) (-1.40) 
AbnormalEarn 0.4549 -0.1497 
 (1.42) (-0.18) 
ZSCORE -0.0210 0.0021 
 (-1.38) (0.18) 
MTB -0.2399 0.7967*** 
 (-0.70) (2.86) 
RATING 0.0738* -0.0131 
 (1.93) (-0.13) 
TENURE  0.1021** 
  (2.52) 
CEOAGE  0.1123*** 
  (-2.75) 
INTERCEPT 2.394* 3.997 
 (1.70) （0.54） 
N 344 348 
R
2
adj 0.054 0.168 
 Table 4.2B Relation between Secured Debt Ratio and CEO portfolio 
Price/Volatility Sensitivities: Second Stage Regression of 2SLS  
This table shows the 2SLS estimation. In Model 3, I use predicted values of LNDELTA and 
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LNVEGA as proxies of managerial incentives based on first stage regression. In Model 4, I 
exclude LNDELTA as Model 2 of Table 4.1. For some missing values of instruments, Model 3 
includes 329 observations and Model 4 has 347 observations. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. I use ***, **, and * to indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero 





Model 3 Model 4 





LNVEGA + 0.0714* 0.0609* 
 
 (1.81) (1.72) 
LNSIZE - -0.0904** -0.0918*** 
 
 (-2.04) (-3.62) 
MTB - -0.0493 -0.0563 
 
 (0.76) (0.90) 
LEVERAGE + 0.1630 0.2030 
 
 (0.91) (1.27) 
ABNORMALEARN +/- 0.3510* 0.3650* 
 
 (1.72) (1.83) 
ZSCORE +/- -0.0046* -0.0046* 
 
 (1.70) (1.74) 
RATING +/- -0.0566*** -0.0650*** 
 
 (-3.51) (5.87) 
INTERCEPT  1.089*** 1.070*** 
 
 (4.12) (4.48) 
PROPERTY TYPE  Yes Yes 
N  329 347 
R
2
adj  0.158 0.142 
4.2.3 Change-in-Variables Analysis  
△ SECURED DEBT RATIOi,t  = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 △ LNVEGAi,t  + 𝑎2 △ LNDELTAi,t + 𝑎3 △
         𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + 𝑎4 △ MTBi,t + 𝑎5 △LEVERAGEi,t  + 𝑎6 △ 𝐴𝐵𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁i,t +
          𝑎7 △ 𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝑎8 △ 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀i,t…... (2) 
Following the above equation, I estimate the change-in-variable regression, as 
opposed to variable levels, to investigate the robustness of random effect estimation. 
Taking first differences reduces the sample size from 360 to 295 observations. In 
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Table 4.3, the results of Model 5 are consistent with Model 1-4, showing a positive 
and significant coefficient (0.0273). Other independent variables show the similar 
coefficients as in the previous regressions. Overall, these change-in-variables results 
confirm the earlier findings based on variable levels. 
Table 4.3 Relation between Secured Debt Ratio and CEO Portfolio 
Price/Volatility Sensitivities: Change-in-Variable Regression 
This table shows the result of change-in-variable regression. I compute the first differences 
for both dependent and independent variables. The sample includes 295 observations after I 
take the first differences. All variables are defined in Appendix A. I use ***, **, and * to 
indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. 
Independent Variables Predicted sign 
Change in Variables 
Model 5 
Δ LNDELTA +/- 0.0029 
 
 (-0.18) 
Δ LNVEGA + 0.0277* 
 
 (-1.70) 
Δ LNSIZE - -0.1150 
 
 (-1.35) 
Δ MTB - 0.1290 
 
 (-1.48) 
Δ LEVERAGE + 0.0074 
 
 (-0.04) 
Δ ABNORMALEARN +/- 0.2180** 
 
 (-1.99) 
Δ ZSCORE +/- 0.0098*** 
 
 (-3.92) 
Δ RATING +/- -0.0234 
 
 (-0.96) 
INTERCEPT  0.0135 
 
 (-1.04) 
PROPERTY TYPE  Yes 
N  295 
R
2
adj  0.159 
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4.3 Wealth effect of Secured Debt and CEO Managerial Risk-taking Incentives 
So far the positive relation between secured debt ratio and CEO risk-taking incentive 
is confirmed to be consistent with “Free cash flow hypothesis” and “Cost contracting 
hypothesis”, it is still unclear which hypothesis dominants the relation. “Free cash 
flow hypothesis” argues that risk-taking incentive would encourage firm to use more 
secured debt to obtain more cash flow for external financing. However, “Cost 
contracting hypothesis” indicates that risk-taking incentive would induce more 
secured debt to alleviate the agency cost between shareholders and creditors which is 
increased for large risk-taking compensation incentive.  
To distinguish between the two hypotheses and have a better understanding of what 
drives the positive relation between LNVEGA and secured debt ratio, I examine the 
wealth effect of secured debt ratio change, and in particular, the influence of CEO 
risk-taking incentive on wealth effect of secured debt ratio change to shareholders. 
“Free cash flow hypothesis” predicts the positive relation between wealth effect of 
secured debt ratio change associated with CEO risk-taking incentive (LNVEGA), 
because secured debt ratio change benefits shareholders. Alternatively, “Cost 
contracting hypothesis” implies that value of secured debt ratio change decreases in 
LNVEGA, because creditors rather than shareholders benefit from secured debt ratio 
change. 
Following the methodology of Faulkender & Wang (2006) and Liu et al. (2010), I 
estimate the following regression to address the impact of managerial risk-taking 
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incentive on value of secured debt ratio change.  
   ri,t − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵 = 
          𝑎0 + 𝑎1 △ SECURED DEBT RATIOi,t  + 𝑎2 SECURED DEBT RATIOi,t +
          𝑎3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸i,t + 𝑎4 PricetoFFOi,t + 𝑎5 LNVEGAi,t + 𝑎6 LNDELTAi,t + 𝑎7 LNVEGA ×
          △ SECURED DEBT RATIOi,t + 𝑎8 LNDELTA×△ SECURED DEBT RATIOi,t + 𝜀i,t ……(3) 
In Equation (3), the dependent variable is excess return, which is the difference 
between firm i stock return over year t-1 to year t (ri,t) and matched constructed 
REITs size and market-to-book portfolio return from t-1 to year t (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵 ).  
The coefficients on the incentive variables (α5 and α6 ) measure the direct effect of 
compensation incentives on excess returns, and the coefficients on the interactions of 
the incentive variables with the change of secured debt ratio (α7 and α8) measure the 
effect of compensation incentives on wealth effect of secured debt ratio change. The 
coefficient of interest is α7 (coefficient on LNVEGA×ΔSECURED DEBT RATIOi,t. ), 
which measures the effect of CEO risk-taking incentive on wealth effect of secured 
debt ratio change. “Free cash flow hypothesis” predicts a positive α7. Whereas “Cost 
contracting hypothesis” indicates a negative α7, because secured debt ratio increase is 
more likely to benefit creditors to mitigate the enlarged agency cost between 
shareholders and creditors for managerial risk-increasing incentive.  
Table 4.4 reports the regression of excess stock returns on CEO compensation 
incentives, interaction variables and control variables. Model 6 and Model 7 use the 
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original incentives and incentives interacted with change of secured debt ratio. The 
coefficient on LNVEGA interacted with change of secured debt ratio is significantly 
negative in both Model 6 and Model 7, which supports “Cost contracting hypothesis”. 
In Model 8 and Model 9, both incentives and interacted variables are replaced by 
dummy variables. LNVEGA (LNDELTA) equals to one if it is above the sample 
median, otherwise zero. Dummy1 (Dummy2) is one if interaction of LNVEGA 
(LNDELTA) with the change of secured debt ratio is above the median, otherwise 
zero. The coefficients on LNVEGA×ΔSECURED DEBT RATIO are still negative and 
significant in Model 8 and Model 9. The consistent results confirm that the positive 
relation between secured debt ratio and risk-increasing incentive (LNVEGA) is 
largely driven by the desire of firms to obtain a large amount of secured debt to 
moderate the cost of debt arising from CEO risk-taking incentive. 
Besides the key variables, I also find that Price-to-FFO ratio has a positive and 
significant coefficient, which suggests that firms with higher Price to FFO ratio tend 
to have more growth opportunities and better market performance.  
Table 4.4 Wealth effect of the interaction between CEO portfolio price/volatility 
sensitivities and secured debt ratio change 
This table shows the impact of interaction between secured debt ratio change and LNVEGA 
on excess return to examine the wealth effect. Dependent variable is excess return and it is 
computed as the stock return of individual REIT subtracts the return of REIT portfolio. The 
return of REIT portfolio is average return of the stock returns of REITs with the same size and 
MTB. Model 6 and 7 use the original incentives and incentive interacted with change of 
secured debt ratio. Model 8 and 9 use dummy incentives, LNVEGA and LNDELTA equal to 
one if they are above the sample medians, so do the interacted variables. Dummy 1 is the 
dummy variable of interaction term LNDELTA×ΔSECURED DEBT RATIO. Dummy 2 is 
the dummy variable of interaction term LNVEGA×ΔSECURED DEBT RATIO. Model 7 and 
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Model 9 only exclude LNDELTA and the interaction term with delta. The sample contains 
297 observations. All variables are defined in Appendix A. I use ***, **, and * to indicate the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Independent Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
ΔSECURED DEBT RATIO 0.0318** 0.0305*** 0.0258** 0.0236** 
 
(-2.14) (-2.79) (-2.31) (-2.56) 
SECURED DEBT RATIO 0.0019 0.0020 0.0026 0.0035 
 
(0.30) (0.31) (0.39) (0.54) 
LEVERAGE 0.0014 0.0013 0.0031 0.0030 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (0.24) 
PricetoFFO  -0.0855* -0.0860* -0.0883** -0.0814* 
 
(-1.91) (-1.94) (2.02) (1.87) 
LNDELTA×ΔSECURED 
DEBT RATIO 
-0.0004    
(0.08)    
LNVEGA×ΔSECURED 
DEBT RATIO 
-0.0091** -0.0093***   
(-1.96) (-2.85)   
Dummy 1   -0.0042  
 
  (0.26)  
Dummy 2   -0.0401** -0.0419*** 
 
  (-2.45) (-3.01) 
LNDELTA -0.0001  0.0077*  
 
(-0.07)  (-1.95)  
LNVEGA 0.0012 0.0012 0.0030 0.0055 
 
(0.94) (1.37) (0.75) (-1.46) 
INTERCEPT 0.0022 0.0020 -0.0046 -0.0007 
 
(-0.12) (-0.11) (-0.24) (-0.04) 
PROPERTY TYPE yes yes yes Yes 
N 297 297 297 297 
R
2
adj 0.045 0.046 0.076 0.056 
 
All the results are further confirmed by a robustness test shown in Table 4.5. To 
measure the wealth effect, the event has to happen first before the post-event returns 
are measured. Thus, I use all independent variables at t-1 period to reexamine the 




Table 4.5 Wealth effect of the interaction between CEO portfolio price/volatility 
sensitivities and secured debt ratio change: Robustness test 
This table shows the impact of interaction between secured debt ratio change and LNVEGA 
on excess return to examine the wealth effect. All variables are the same as those in Table 4.4 
except that all independent variables are examined at t-1 period, dependent variable still is 
excess return at t period.. Model 10 and 11 use the original incentives at t-1 period and 
incentive at t-1 period interacted with change of secured debt ratio. Model 11 only exclude 
LNDELTAt-1 and the interaction term with delta. The sample contains 295 observations. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. I use ***, **, and * to indicate the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Independent Variables Model 10 Model 11 
ΔSECURED DEBT RATIO 0.0303** 0.0277** 
 
(2.21) (2.57) 
SECURED DEBT RATIOt-1 -0.00143 -0.000309 
 
(-0.23) (-0.05) 
LEVERAGE t-1 0.0237** 0.0226* 
 
(1.99) (1.88) 
PricetoFFO t-1 0.000149** 0.000129* 
 
(2.06) (1.84) 




LNVEGA t-1×ΔSECURED DEBT RATIO 
-0.00853* -0.00912*** 
(-1.95) (-2.77) 
LNDELTA t-1 -0.00258***  
 
(-2.63)  
LNVEGA t-1 0.00284** 0.000855 
 
(2.52) (1.01) 
INTERCEPT 0.00929 -0.0132** 
 
(-1.48) (-2.14) 
PROPERTY TYPE yes yes 
N 295 295 
R
2
adj 0.086 0.085 
  
4.4 Summary 
This chapter includes a detailed presentation of the empirical methods and results. It is 
found that secured debt ratio increases in CEO risk-taking incentive. This relation is 
confirmed by several model specifications. In order to find a better explanation for 
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this positive relation, I test the wealth effect of the change of secured debt ratio and 
CEO managerial risk-taking incentive. All the empirical evidences supports “Cost 
contracting hypothesis”, which indicates that REITs increase the ratio of secured debt 
to attenuate the increasing shareholders-creditors agency problem arising from CEO 
high risk-taking incentive. 
. 
 67 
Chapter 5 Conclusions 
5.1 Contributions 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First is the discovery of the 
connection between secured debt ratio and executive equity-based compensation. 
Certainly compensation correlated with managerial incentives is one of the factors 
that would influence debt financing policies, including secured debt utilization. The 
relation between secured debt and compensation regarding managerial shareholdings 
has been detected by earlier studies (Ooi, 2001). Whereas the linkage between secured 
debt ratio and managerial risk-taking incentive has not been considered when equity 
compensation is taken as the proxy of managerial risk appetite. Hence, the innovation 
is to use equity compensation as the proxy of managerial risk preference to detect the 
impact of managerial risk-taking incentive on secured debt ratio.  
The second contribution is the unique approach that is used to distinguish two 
different hypotheses, and to test the wealth effect of secured debt ratio change 
associated with managerial risk-taking incentive. Using the interaction between 
secured debt ratio change and managerial incentive proxy LNVEGA as independent 
variable, and the excess return as dependent variable, I am able to tell which 
hypothesis dominates the positive relation between secured debt ratio and LNVEGA. 
When the positive relation is confirmed between excess return and the interaction 
term, which means shareholders favor the increase of secured debt ratio associated 
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with managerial risk-taking incentives. On the other hand, the negative relation will 
indicate the increase of secured debt ratio is used to compensate creditors when 
managerial risk-taking incentives enlarge the agency cost between shareholders and 
creditors. 
In terms of methodology, this work tries to detect the relation between daily changing 
excess stock return and annually updated executive compensation. To cope with the 
data mismatch, this study constructs a portfolio based on firm size and 
market-to-book value to isolate the influence of secured debt ratio change correlated 
with managerial incentives on stock return. This method is invented by Fama & 
French (1993) and used by Faulkender & Wang (2006). Very few studies have used 
this method to explore the impact of managerial incentive on stock return.  
5.2 Summary of Main Findings 
In this study, I examine the causal link between managerial risk-taking incentive and 
corporate secured debt using a sample of 360 firm-year observations with 68 REITs 
from 2001 to 2009. The ratio of secured debt in total debt serves as dependent 
variables. Managerial option portfolio sensitivities to stock price and stock return 
volatility are key independent variables which are estimated as Core & Guay (2002) 
approach. To find out the influence of managerial risk-taking incentive on secured 
debt usage in REITs, I apply several empirical methodologies (e.g. random effect, 
2SLS estimation and change-in-variable regressions). As hypothesized, I find a 
positive relation between executive risk-taking incentive and secured debt ratio. In 
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addition, I empirically test the two possible explanations regarding this positive 
relation by examining wealth effect of secured debt ratio change associated with 
managerial incentive. Taken together, these findings suggest that secured debt ratio is 
positively correlated with managerial risk-taking incentive in REIT industry. Firms 
with higher managerial risk-taking incentives would like to use more secured debt to 
mitigate the increased shareholders-creditors agency cost arising from managerial 
risk-increasing incentives. The results are robust for controlling CEO risk-decreasing 
incentives, CEO cash compensation, CEO tenure, firm size, growth opportunities, 
leverage, credit rating and other firm characteristics.  
This work focuses on the correlation between secured debt and executive 
compensation. A few findings need to be emphasized. First is the positive relation 
between secured debt and managerial risk-taking incentive (LNVEGA). This relation 
is confirmed by several robustness tests. This relation indicates that secured debt ratio 
increases in managerial risk-taking incentive.  
Second, I find that this positive relation is probably driven by the fact that 
shareholders try to raise secured debt ratio to compensate creditors because of the 
increasing managerial risk-taking incentive.  
5.3 Limitations 
Although this study covers as much as is possible, it does have several limitations. As 
for the methodology, despite quite a few studies, including this study, use 
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Black-Scholes option formula to compute delta and vega as managerial incentives, 
some scholars concern the applicability of the Black-Scholes method. Ross (2004) 
and Lewellen (2006) argue that options could provide contradicting incentives. Hence, 
it is better to use alternative incentive estimation to further confirm the empirical 
results. 
I try to generate excess return by constructing REIT size and market-to-book 
benchmark portfolios. Certainly the way to construct portfolios is following Fama & 
French (1993), and also it is a possible way to alleviate the influence that probably 
affects stock return other than executive compensation and secured debt ratio. This 
approach has never been evaluated and compared, so the efficiency of this approach is 
still a question. 
As for managerial incentives, this study did not consider all forms of compensation 
because the main concern is managerial equity compensation which is highly 
correlated with managerial risk preference. However, the compensation package 
including cash, pension fund or other compensations would also influence managerial 
risk appetite.  
This study did not consider the impact of corporate governance, and how corporate 
governance would affect the relation between excess return and secured debt ratio 
change with compensation. This relation could become insignificant if a firm with 
good corporate governance system restricts managerial incentive.  
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This study did not consider the marcoeconomic factors, such as interest rate, which 
would probably affect the usage of secured debt. Also this study did not discuss the 
how the regulation changes would affect corporate equity compensation policies. 
Equity compensation is relatively new for the managerial compensation package, and 
several new regulations regarding managerial stock option expensing have been 
released in the past few years. The new regulations
6
 could affect corporate stock 
option granted plan.  
Since only around 50% of REITs have equity compensation data, this study may not 
fully reveal the relation between secured debt and managerial risk-taking incentive 
through equity compensation. The relatively small sample restricts this study to 
explore more possible effects of equity compensation on debt security decisions.  
5.4 Recommendation for Further Research  
With a larger sample size, more robustness tests can be done to investigate the relation 
between secured debt and managerial compensation. For instance, I could use the 
compensation proxies at t-1 period to address the endogenity or to consider regulation 
or maceconomic factors.  
Corporate governance factors can be added as control variables to see whether 
                                                 
6 For instance, the Financial Accounting and Standards Board issued accounting rule 123(R) in 2004 which 
requires firms to expense their stock option grants in the earnings statement. This reduces current earnings, and 
makes the stock option grants a less attractive tool for managerial compensation. 
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corporate governance would affect the relation between secured debt and managerial 
risk-taking incentives.  
Certainty-equivalence approach could be used to address the concern on the 
applicability of Black-Scholes formula. Chava & Purnanandam (2010) aruge this 
approach is better to address the conflicting incentives by incorporating managerial 
risk aversion in the model. In addition, this method aggregates both stock and option 
holdings on managerial risk incentives. Therefore, certainty-equivalence approach 
provides an alternative way to estimate managerial incentive, which could be used as 
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Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
ABNORMALEARN (Earingst+1 − Earingst) ÷ (SharePrice ×
Number of Outstanding Sharest)  
Data source: COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial file. 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt divided by the market value of firm. 
Data source: COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial file. 
LSIZE Market value of equity plus book value of total assets 
minus book value of equity, in logs. Data source: 
COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial file. 
MTB Market value of firm divided by book value of total 
assets. Data source: COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial 
file. 
PricetoFFO Price to FFO ratio is a ratio comparing the share price to 
the funds from operation (per share) in period t. 
RATING  Number from 1 to 19(eg. 1 for CCC-,19 for AAA). 
Rating is defined as the average of Standard&Poor’s 
rating and Moody’s rating. If only one agency has the 
rating for a firm. That one will be used as the firm’s 
rating. Data source: COMPUSTAT Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities Database. 
SECURED_DEBT_RATIO Secured debt/Total debt. Total debt is defined as debt in 
current liabilities plus long-term debt. Data source: 
COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial file. 
ZSCORE Revised Altman Z-score is computed as  














Data source: COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial file. 
CASHCOMP_RATIO Sum of CEO salary and bonus scaled by Total 
Compensation. Data source: Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database. 
DELTA 1% value change in CEO’s stock and option portfolio 
with respect to 1% firm stock price change. Data 
source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
VEGA 1% value change in CEO’s portfolio due to 1% change 
in annualized standard deviation of firm stock return. 
Data source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
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LNDELTA Natural logarithm of DELTA. Data source: Standard and 
Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
LNVEGA  Natural logarithm of VEGA. Data source: Standard and 
Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
TENURE CEO tenure measured in years. Data source: Standard 
and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
AGE CEO age stated in years. Data source: Standard and 
Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
FIRM AGE The period from the time firm listed to the time firm 
delisted measured in years. Data source: COMPUSTAT 
Annual Industrial file. 
 
